The Morgan Doctrine: China NOT a victim

Thursday, August 11, 2011

China NOT a victim

Does the following Network World quote (about China's being hit with 480,000 trojan horse attacks in 2010) raise any questions about the veracity of their claim?

China's National Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team (CNCERT) released some of the figures on Tuesday from an upcoming annual report. Of the 221,000 attacks that originated outside of China, 14.7 percent came from the U.S., while another 8.8 percent came from India.

Read it again. Any questions? Okay, now compare this to all the anti-American signs you see during riots and demonstrations in the Middle East. Notice that those signs written in English, rather than Urdu or Arabic, etc. Definitely intended for consumption by American media. Finally, consider the Russian acronyms: KGB and GRU. We know what those organizations do, thanks to a wealth of spy fiction from the likes of Tom Clancy and Robert Ludlum. KGB stands for Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, or Committee for State Security. Similarly, GRU stands for Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye, or Main Intelligence Directorate. These are Russian terms that do not translate directly into their literal English acronyms. Now, read the Network World paragraph again.

Does it seem strange that the acronym CNCERT is for English-language consumption and quite literally stands for China's National Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team? Even the Russians, another major haven for cyber crime and cyber espionage, aren't this stupid or patently transparent.

Sorry China, but I'm still waiting for an explanation of the IP addresses I previously published on November 11th of last year identifying the Chinese attack servers hitting my Linux systems.

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Implementation suggestions for THE MORGAN DOCTRINE are most welcome. What are the "Got'chas!"? What questions would some future Cyber Privateering Czar have to answer about this in a Senate confirmation hearing?

Background: Welcome black hats, white hats and cyber swashbucklers

The Revolutionary War was fought, financed, and pretty well WON by bonded privateers, legalized pirates who were given Letters of Marque and Reprisal by the Continental Congress and authorized to attack, capture and monetize British ships. The purpose of this site is to explore the possibility of a modern-day doctrine much like the Monroe Doctrine, by means of which the U.S. government could legally and, more importantly, effectively stop international hackers. Current cybercrime law is not only ineffective, but downright stupid. My Linux servers are attacked hundreds of times a day (mostly from China and former USSR domains), yet if I retaliate against those servers with some creative technology at my disposal (I know some VERY smart guys), then I am in violation of federal law and subject to some onerous penalties. We need more than a new law. We need a new international doctrine. I call it The Morgan Doctrine, named after Morgan Rapier, a fictional character I've created (hey, this is my way of establishing ownership of the concept, should it ever see the light of day).

Why a new international doctrine? Simply, nothing else will work. Introduced on December 2, 1823, the Monroe Doctrine told the world to keep their hands off the Americas. Combine this with current legal thinking on "hot pursuit" of fugitives. In 1917 the US Army went into Mexico after Pancho Villa. More recently, in 1960 Israeli Mossad agents abducted Adolf Eichmann from Argentina. Granted, much of the world regards the Eichmann adventure as a violation of international law. I don't share that opinion and therefore use it as the third leg of my Monroe-Pancho-Aldof platform for The Morgan Doctrine.

If someone comes into your home and attacks or attempts to rob you, you may shoot them dead. You may do so as long as they expire on your property. But what about cyber criminals? They attack you in your home from their homes. Retaliate in kind, and you go to jail. The Morgan Doctrine states simply that if you attack my computers (or my banking assets held in US-based computers), then under a certain set of well-defined conditions, a licensed and bonded "cyber privateer" may attack you in your home country and split the proceeds with the U.S. government. For the sake of argument, let's call it a 50-50 split (heh heh).

Right now, American law enforcement is completely unequipped to deal with the sheer number international cyber hackers. Sure, I could report each of the thousand daily attacks to the FBI, as could the millions of other attackees in the USA. But the volume of such reports would make any meaningful resolution laughable. Not to mention that the FBI has no jurisdiction outside the USA. Yet to make such "enforcement" profitable to recognized (ie, "bonded" "deputized") privateers, as Heath Ledger's Joker said in his last role, "Now you're talking!" You raid our bank accounts, we raid yours. You make money from off-shore child pornography, we're going to loot your bank accounts and, with some REALLY creative black hat operations, you will be taken off the grid worldwide to the extent that you'll not even complete a cell phone conversation for the remainder of your miserable depraved life. Okay, that last part probably won't fly, but you get my drift.

The purpose of this site is to explore the mechanics, legalities and practicality of The Morgan Doctrine.

And I will be the sole arbiter of whether or not your comments get posted. As Mel Brooks wrote, "It's good to be king."