The Trouble with PRISM

The trouble with our PRISM spying operation is, as illustrated in yesterday's Register article (see it here), is that it was SECRET. Which means that Snowden's assertion that we'd hacked the Chinese since 2009 would inevitably come out and undermine our foreign policy. It certainly wasn't secret from the Chinese. Or the Russians. Or the Iranians. No Grasshopper. It was just secret from the American public. Had our public policy been The Morgan Doctrine, then public Rules of Engagement (ROE) would have saved us a lot of embarrassment. Of course, it would have caused the "Beltway Bandits" serious revenue shortfalls, because we'd have made counter-hacking a money crop for the federal government, instead of the money pit it now is. Once again, let my "voice crying from the wilderness" suggest adherence to The Cyber Privateer Code of Conduct (read it here).

Possible Legal Defense of PRISM Leaker Edward Snowden

I'm flatly amazed at the seismic furor caused by the UK Gardian's citing Edward Snowden's outing of PRISM, given the lack of media attention given FBI Director Mueller's public attempt over 2 yeas ago to have Silicon Valley software companies build trap doors into their products (see my 2011 report here). Come on, media-tards! Just what do you think has been going on for the last two years?

If Snowden does manage to get himself extradited back to the U.S. for what the Guardian claims will be the risk of "major jail time" (see the story here), I would contend that his attorneys could argue that he did not technically violate the spirit of any NDAs he signed. Whenever I sign an NDA with a high-tech client, there is always a clause that says I'm not in violation of the agreement if the information I disclose is available through other publicly available sources.

I think one could reasonably infer the existence and functionality of PRISM from publicly available documents. I expect, though, that Snowden's trial will not be a public one.

Hacking the Human Genome for Fun and Apocalypse

Transhumanist acolyte Ray Kurzweil just gave all the FTW jihadists a blueprint for ending life as we know it on earth in today's newsletter. Of course, he can claim he was just reporting on a published report (see the Kurzweil newsletter here). Naturally, partial funding for this "Fast new, one-step genetic engineering technology" project came from…the China Scholarship Council. Yep, those whacky Chinese are hacking everything in site, including non-vonNeumann biological mechanisms. Key quotes in the article:

They describe development and successful laboratory tests of clonetegration in E. coli and Salmonella typhimurium bacteria, which are used in biotechnology. The method is quick, efficient and easy to do and can integrate multiple genes at the same time. They predict that clonetegration “will become a valuable technique facilitating genetic engineering with difficult-to-clone sequences and rapid construction of synthetic biological systems.”

The authors acknowledge funding from the China Scholarship Council, the National Science Foundation, Synthetic Biology Engineering Research Center, the Human Frontier Science Program, the Australian Research Council and a William H. Elliott Biochemistry Fellowship.

Transhumanism uses the symbol "H+" to describe accelerating human evolution. There's a lot of "H-" (read that as "H-minus") possibility too, courtesy of the mental/physical midget in North Korea, or our fun-loving jihadist friends in the Middle East.

Thanks for sharing, Ray.

Weak arguments against allowing cyber retaliation

The "Beltway Bandits" do not want to lose their source of lucrative government contracts, which is why the "stalking horses"have been tasked with killing the notion (see today's Computerworld article here). Here's argument from the article:

"This is a remarkably bad idea." said James Lewis, senior fellow and director of the technology and public policy program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "It would harm the national interest."

Adherence to my Cyber Privateer Code of Conduct mitigates against damages to innocents caught in the middle. Which is my comment posted at the end of the article:

Rick BennettCollapse

Consider the source of the recommendation against retaliation. And rather than looking at ways to protect/indemnify the innocent caught in the middle of retaliation, they look for reasons NOT to allow retaliation at all. A workable retaliation code of conduct is at www.cyberprivateer.com.

Iran's Letter to the New York Times

I'm sure glad I get to pick my clients, because I'd really hate to be the PR flack assigned to paint Iran in a good light. Take, for example, today's letter (read it here) from Alireza Miryousefi, the head of press office in Iran's mission to the United Nations. My advice to anyone having a meeting with Alireza is don't make any sudden moves, like to straighten your hair. It could cause the poor devil to flinch or even dive under a nearby desk. And to Alireza Miryousefi, you should remember what happened to Iraqi's foreign minister Tariq Aziz and ask for political asylum while you're here in the U.S.

What makes the Iranian letter to the NYT more laughable is a later story in today's Wall Street Journal (read it here) saying that "Iranian-backed hackers have escalated a campaign of cyberassaults against U.S. corporations by launching infiltation and surveillance missions against the computer networks running energy companies…"

Selah, Alireza!