The Morgan Doctrine: The Perfect Virus principle #10: No Common Denominator

Friday, December 3, 2010

The Perfect Virus principle #10: No Common Denominator

As indicated in my post of Monday, 11/22/2010, I am extrapolating Jeff Walker's Principles for the Perfect Application into a discussion of The Perfect Virus. Since Jeff's monograph on the subject did not anticipate stealth or suicide mechanisms, any errors or lapses into stupidity are solely my additions and should not reflect poorly on what I consider to be the biggest single contribution to software application design since the invention of computers. And Jeff, thanks for giving me permission to do surgery on your baby.

THE PRINCIPLE OF NO COMMON DENOMINATOR: The Perfect Virus exploits the strengths of underlying hardware and software, even when those strengths are not universally available.

No Common Denominator is one of the benefits of principle #7, Black Box Portability. Combined with #9, Native Implementation, The Perfect Virus will not only be exhibit more Stealth (principle #14) because of Performance (principle #4), but it will leave a smaller footprint, also a Stealth principle. Finally, because of principle #3, Seamless Migration, pieces of The Perfect Virus can be distributed to systems under your control. Specifically, you might have highly computational requirements that can't possibly be hidden if run on a target system. They may in fact require a server farm or even a supercomputer. We'll cover this in more detail in the Stealth discussion.

Your assignment, prior to Wednesday when I post principle #14 on Stealth, is to get into the proper frame of mind by renting or buying (and viewing) the Woody Harrelson movie Zombieland. Specifically, Jesse Eisenberg's rules to live by.

The No Common Denominator system might even be a one-of-a-kind asset, like maybe the Chinese Mother Ship—the control system for their Mother Fleet (MF) —designed for world cyber domination. It might be the attitude control computer in a military or communications satellite, or nuclear codes in the "President's Football" (who's to say you aren't sitting at a state dinner using high-frequency electronics aimed at the guy with the briefcase handcuffed to his wrist to unleash a little surprise on Mecca?). That's right, grasshopper. Just because you're fighting a cyber war, don't expect real destruction and real death to be far behind.

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Background: Welcome black hats, white hats and cyber swashbucklers

The Revolutionary War was fought, financed, and pretty well WON by bonded privateers, legalized pirates who were given Letters of Marque and Reprisal by the Continental Congress and authorized to attack, capture and monetize British ships. The purpose of this site is to explore the possibility of a modern-day doctrine much like the Monroe Doctrine, by means of which the U.S. government could legally and, more importantly, effectively stop international hackers. Current cybercrime law is not only ineffective, but downright stupid. My Linux servers are attacked hundreds of times a day (mostly from China and former USSR domains), yet if I retaliate against those servers with some creative technology at my disposal (I know some VERY smart guys), then I am in violation of federal law and subject to some onerous penalties. We need more than a new law. We need a new international doctrine. I call it The Morgan Doctrine, named after Morgan Rapier, a fictional character I've created (hey, this is my way of establishing ownership of the concept, should it ever see the light of day).

Why a new international doctrine? Simply, nothing else will work. Introduced on December 2, 1823, the Monroe Doctrine told the world to keep their hands off the Americas. Combine this with current legal thinking on "hot pursuit" of fugitives. In 1917 the US Army went into Mexico after Pancho Villa. More recently, in 1960 Israeli Mossad agents abducted Adolf Eichmann from Argentina. Granted, much of the world regards the Eichmann adventure as a violation of international law. I don't share that opinion and therefore use it as the third leg of my Monroe-Pancho-Aldof platform for The Morgan Doctrine.

If someone comes into your home and attacks or attempts to rob you, you may shoot them dead. You may do so as long as they expire on your property. But what about cyber criminals? They attack you in your home from their homes. Retaliate in kind, and you go to jail. The Morgan Doctrine states simply that if you attack my computers (or my banking assets held in US-based computers), then under a certain set of well-defined conditions, a licensed and bonded "cyber privateer" may attack you in your home country and split the proceeds with the U.S. government. For the sake of argument, let's call it a 50-50 split (heh heh).

Right now, American law enforcement is completely unequipped to deal with the sheer number international cyber hackers. Sure, I could report each of the thousand daily attacks to the FBI, as could the millions of other attackees in the USA. But the volume of such reports would make any meaningful resolution laughable. Not to mention that the FBI has no jurisdiction outside the USA. Yet to make such "enforcement" profitable to recognized (ie, "bonded" "deputized") privateers, as Heath Ledger's Joker said in his last role, "Now you're talking!" You raid our bank accounts, we raid yours. You make money from off-shore child pornography, we're going to loot your bank accounts and, with some REALLY creative black hat operations, you will be taken off the grid worldwide to the extent that you'll not even complete a cell phone conversation for the remainder of your miserable depraved life. Okay, that last part probably won't fly, but you get my drift.

The purpose of this site is to explore the mechanics, legalities and practicality of The Morgan Doctrine.

And I will be the sole arbiter of whether or not your comments get posted. As Mel Brooks wrote, "It's good to be king."

Friday, December 3, 2010

The Perfect Virus principle #10: No Common Denominator

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